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Schoolbooks In the Missouri River?
A Possible Response to
Missouri v. Jenkins,
Rally Mohawks! bring out your axes,
And tell King George we'll pay no taxes
On his foreign tea;
His threats are vain, and vain to think
To force our girls and wives to drink
His vile Bohea!
fragment of a Boston tavern song (1773-74)
inspiredby the Boston Tea Party2
I. INTRODUCTION

Nearly everyone who has been a student in an American history course
is familiar with the Boston Tea Party. As a prelude to the Revolutionary War,
a group of Colonists dumped a load of tea into Boston Harbor in protest of a
tax levied by George HI, King of Great Britain, and the British Parliament.
The event, which was synonymous with the cry of "no taxation without
representation," served the Colonists by uniting them to further resist British
interference in their affairs.4
Recently, the theme of this phrase has once again served as a rallying
point to bring together an informal coalition of citizens from across the nation.
The focus of their concern is Missouri v. Jenkins,' a 1990 United States
Supreme Court decision. In Jenkins, a majority of the Court held that, under
the appropriate set of circumstances, a judge could indirectly order a tax
increase to generate revenue for the purpose of remedying a constitutional
violation.6

1. 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).

2. W. GRISwoLD, THE NIGHT THE REVOLUTION BEGAN title page (1972).
3. For a historical account of the Boston Tea Party, see B. WOODS, THE BOSTON
TEA PARY (1964).
4. Id. at 255.
5. 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
6. 1L at 1666. The Court reversed the lower court's decision to impose a
property tax under this set of facts. In sixteen-plus pages of dicta, however, the Court,
embarks in a sharply worded debate on whether a court, under any circumstance, could
impose such a tax. Id. at 1662-79.
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The reaction to Jenkins was swift and severe. Less than seventy-two
hours after the opinion was announced, Senator Jack Danforth (R-Mo.), along
with Senators Bond (R-Mo.), Dole (R-Kan.), Wallop (R-Wyo.), and Kassebaum (R-Kan.), introduced a constitutional amendment that would prevent
members of the judiciary from imposing taxes directly or indirectly.' Within

two weeks, more than twenty senators joined as co-sponsors of the amendment In the debate that followed, other senators voiced their opinions on
the Jenkins decision. Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) summarized the Court's
action:
I can think of no more far-reaching decision the Court has handed
down, when it has, in effect, authorized the imposition of taxes or has
entered an order that a district court has the power to set aside State,
constitutional limitations.
This may even be a more far-reaching decision than Brown versus
Board ofEducation. In fact, it may be that we have to go back to Marbury
versus Madison, in 1803, where the Supreme Court of the United States
decided that the Court itself had the power to decide constitutional
issues,
9
to find a decision which is as far-reaching as is this decision.
It is too early to determine whether Jenkins will earn such a prestigious
place in American legal history. It is apparent, however, that the Court in
Jenkins did act in an extraordinary manner. Thus, it is important to
understand the facts surrounding the case in order to place the decision in
proper perspective.
II. BRIEF HISTORY, FACTS, AND HOLDING OF JENKINS

A. The Kansas City Desegregation Case
Missouri v. Jenkins is one piece of the complex puzzle of litigation
involving the desegregation of the Kansas City Metropolitan School District
(KCMSD).' ° The original lawsuit was filed in 1977 on behalf of Kalima
Jenkins, alleging that a number of actors, including both the Missouri and
Kansas state governments, had contributed to the continued existence of a dual

7. S.J. Res. 295, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S4771 (daily ed. Apr.
20, 1990). The text of the amendment reads as follows: "Neither the Supreme Court
nor any inferior court of the United States shall have the power to instruct or order a

State or political subdivision thereof, or an official of such State or political
subdivision, to lay or increase taxes." Id.
8. 136 CONG. REC. S5291 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1990) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
9. Id. at S5342 (statement of Sen. Specter).
10. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1655.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/7
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school system." The case was argued before Russell G. Clark, United States
District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.'2 Judge Clark ruled
against the State of Missouri and the KCMSD and ordered development of a
plan to "remov[e] the vestiges of the dual school system as it presently exists
in the KCMSD. '' 3 The scope and financing of the remedy have served as
further sources of contention between the litigants and other disputes have
been brought before the courts regarding these issues."'
Both the State of Missouri and the KCMSD submitted to the district court
separate detailed proposals to raise the overall effectiveness of the Kansas City
schools and to eliminate the effects of segregation.
The plans called for
numerous changes to increase student achievement. 6
These changes
included adding staff members to enable the KCMSD to achieve AAA status,
reducing class sizes, instituting a summer school program, providing a full-day
kindergarten opportunity for all eligible students, and developing an early
childhood program. 17 A capital improvements component also was included18

The court selected portions of both plans in reaching a final decision on
the appropriate remedy. 9 The cost of the various programs totaled more

11. Jenkins v. State of Mo., 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The
KCMSD joined with the Jenkins class as plaintiffs in the original suit. School Dist.
of Kansas City v. State of Mo., 460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978), appealdismissed,
School Dist. of Kansas City v. State of Mo., 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979). Judge
Clark, who stated that "the potential for conflict of interest between the KCMSD and
the student plaintiffs [was] so severe," dismissed the KCMSD as plaintiff and realigned
it as a defendant. Id. at 442. The original complaint also named the State of Kansas,
a number of Kansas City, Kansas suburban school districts, a number of Kansas City,
Missouri suburban school districts, and various federal agencies including the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as defendants. Id. at 421.
Judge Clark dismissed all of the Kansas parties due to lack of personal jurisdiction.
I& at 445.
12. Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1485.
13. Id. at 1506. The Kansas City, Missouri suburban districts were dismissed
from the case in an earlier order. Id. at 1488. HUD was the only federal agency to
proceed to trial, but it was absolved of any wrongdoing. Id. at 1506.
14. See Jenkins v. State of Mo., 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (scope of
remedy), aff'd as modified, Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mo., 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir.

1986).
15. Id. at 25.
16. Id. at 26-39.
17. Id. AAA status is the highest attainable classification in Missouri's
educational scheme. Id. at 26.
18. Id. at 39-41.
19. Id. at 26-41.
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than 87,000,000 dollars, which was to be expended over a three-year

period. 2 The State of Missouri was ordered to pay approximately 67,500,000 dollars, or seventy-eight percent of the total cost, with the remainder to be
funded by the KCMSD. 1 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the plan formulated
by the district court but divided the costs equally between the State of
Missouri and the KCMSD. 2
The district court re-examined the issue of liability and held that "the
State was responsible for seventy-five percent of the costs of desegregation,
and KCMSD for twenty-five percent."' The court reasoned that "the State
had created the dual school system, and that KCMSD was required to
implement this system under Missouri law."' The court included this factor
in its reasoning and concluded that "the person who starts the fire has more
responsibility for the damages caused than the person who fails to put it
out."25 The court also found the State of Missouri and the KCMSD jointly

and severally liable. 26
In 1987, the case was before the district court again.' The state and the
KCMSD submitted proposals for long-range capital improvements that would
remedy "numerous health and safety hazards, educational environment
hazards, functional impairments, and appearance impairments." 28 The district
court found such expenses to be desegregation expenses "crucial to the overall
success of the desegregation plan. 29
The court found the state's plan, at a total cost of more than 61,000,000
dollars, a "'patch and repair' approach, . . . [which] would not achieve
30
suburban comparability or the visual attractiveness sought by the Court."

Instead, the court adopted the district's plan, with modifications, at a threeyear cost of approximately 187,500,000 dollars.31 The district's plan
included funds for new buildings and for the renovation of other buildings to

20. Id. at 43-44.
21. Id.
22. Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mo., 807 F.2d 657, 686 (8th Cir. 1986).
23. Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mo., 855 F.2d 1295, 1308 (8th Cir. 1988).
24. Id.
25. Id. (quoting Order of July 6, 1987).
26. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1664 (1990).
27. Jenkins v. State of Mo., 672 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part,Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mo., 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988).
28. 1& at 403 (citation omitted).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 404.
31. I& at 408, 413. The total cost of the remedy has reached 460,000,000 dollars,
including a 260,000,000 capital improvements plan and a 200,000,000 dollar magnet
school plan. Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 109 S. Ct. 2463, 2465 (1989).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/7
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to acceptable standards or to convert them into magnet school
raise them
32
facilities.

B. The Taxation Question
The judicial taxation question arose when Judge Clark decided that the
KCMSD would be unable to pay its portion of the costs of the desegregation
remedy3 3 The KCMSD previously had petitioned the district court for
funding relief?' Judge Clark decided not to rule on the motion until after
35
After
funding proposals were submitted and a final plan was approved.
devising a plan, he calculated that the KCMSD would realize a deficit of over
282,000,000 dollars after funding their portion of the desegregation remedy.'
The court suggested that the Missouri Legislature "explore the possibility of
enacting legislation that would permit a district involved in a desegregation
plan more versatility than it presently has to raise funds with which to support
the program."37 The court noted that "[s]uch legislation was introduced but
was received unfavorably and ultimately failed."38
The district court decided that it was "left with no choice but to exercise

its broad equitable powers and enter a judgment that will enable the KCMSD
to raise its share of the cost of the plan and therefore insure that the

32. Id. at 404-08.
The essence of a magnet school is that special programs of educational
significance are placed on a single school site, where students who desire
to pursue those special interest areas are allowed to voluntarily select and
attend the school. Because participation in the program is voluntary, the
school authorities have the ability to control the registration and to establish
proportionate racial representation.
Gordon, School Desegregation: A Look at the 70's and 80's, 18 J. L. & EDUC. 189,
197 (1989).
Magnet Schools have been utilized in St. Louis, Chicago, and Tulsa, as well as
in numerous other desegregation plans. Id. at 197-203. Gordon comments that "[t]he
use of magnets for the purposes of school desegregation is over fifteen years old and
has yet to be proven effective." Id. at 202. He notes, however, that there are
exceptions to the general rule. Id. at 198.
33. Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. at 410-11.
34. Id. at 409.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 410.
37. Id. at 411 (quoting Order of November 12, 1986). Missouri has a complex
taxation scheme that makes it difficult for school districts to generate additional funds.
For a brief discussion of the Missouri constitutional and statutory provisions, see
Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mo., 855 F.2d 1295, 1311-13 (8th Cir. 1988).
38. Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. at 411.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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constitutional violations committed by the KCMSD and the State of Missouri
are cured."39 Judge Clark continued, stating that "[t]he Court is of the firm
conclusion that it has no alternative but to impose tax measures which will
40
enable KCMSD to meet its share of the cost of the desegregation plan."
Specifically, Judge Clark "ordered the property tax levy to be increased to $4
per $100 assessed valuation through the 1991-92 fiscal year, and authorized
KCMSD to issue $150,000,000 in capital improvement bonds, to be retired
within twenty years."4 In addition, he also "imposed a 1.5 percent surcharge
on income of residents and non-residents of KCMSD subject to the Missouri
State Income Tax."'4
Judge Clark briefly explained his authority to take these measures. First,
he cited the Eight Circuit decision of Liddell v. State of Missouri,43 summarizing it to read that "[a] district court's broad equitable power to remedy the
evils of segregation includes the power to order tax increases and bond
issuances."" Second, he relied upon Griffin v. School Board of Prince
Edward County,45 which stated that a court could raise taxes if it was
"necessary to raise funds adequate to... operate and maintain without racial
discrimination a public school system."
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of
the district court.47 First, the court affirmed the scope of the remedy ordered

by the district court.' Next, the court approved the district court's allocation
of fiscal responsibility.4 9
Finally, the court addressed the taxation questions50 The state, as well
as others, challenged both the property tax and the income surcharge."
Concerning the property tax, the appellate court explained that it "[did] not

39. Id.
40. Id. at 412.

41. Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mo., 855 F.2d 1295, 1309 (8th Cir. 1988).
42. Id.
43. 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (dealing with St. Louis desegregation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984).
44. Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. at 412-13.
45. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
46. Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. at 412 (quoting Griffin, 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964)).
47. Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mo., 855 F.2d 1295, 1318 (8th Cir. 1988).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1308.
50. Id. at 1308-09.
51. Id. at 1308. The United States, Icelean Clark (a citizen taxpayers' group), and
the State of Kansas filed amicus briefs. Id. at 1299. Jackson County and Icelean
Clark motioned to intervene as of right, but were denied. Id. at 1299, 1316.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/7
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write on a clean slate."5 2 Apparently satisfied that the United States
Constitution did not forbid judicial imposition of the property tax, the court
found that the reasoning in Liddell applied. 5 3 In Liddell, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that the "broad equitable power" afforded to the district court
"include[d] a narrowly defined power to order increases in local tax levies on
real estate. Limitations on this power require that it be exercised only after
exploration of every other fiscal alternative."' The Jenkins court concluded
that the district court analyzed properly the facts of the case using the Liddell
framework and that Judge Clark was within his authority to levy the property
taxO
The court indicated that the district court would have been within its
power independent of the Liddell decision. 56 The court based its relief upon
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann.5 7 In Swann, a unanimous Court stated that "if a state-imposed limitation on a school authority's.
discretion operates to inhibit or obstruct the operation of a unitary school
system or impede the disestablishing of a dual school system, it must fall;
state policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal
constitutional guarantees."58 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the principle
enunciated in Swann applied to all areas of state law, including taxation
questions. 59
The court of appeals explained that the property tax was the district's sole
means of generating revenue and that Missouri's taxing scheme made it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to generate funds sufficient to finance
the district's portion of the remedy. 60 This scenario allowed the district court
to take action that, in effect, disarmed state statutory and constitutional
provisions."
The court, however, held that Judge Clark exceeded his authority in
ordering the income tax surcharge. 62 The panel felt that this intrusion into

52. Id. at 1310.
53. Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mo., 855 F.2d 1295, 1310-11 (8th Cir. 1988).
54. Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1320.
55. Jenkins by Agyei, 855 F.2d at 1310-11.
56. Id. at 1311.
57. 402 U.S. 43 (1971). This case struck down North Carolina's "Anti-busing
Law." This case was a companion case to the more publicized Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
58. Swann, 402 U.S. at 45.
59. Jenkins by Agyei, 855 F.2d at 1313.
60. Id. at 1311-13; see supra note 37.
61. Id. at 1313.
62. Id. at 1315.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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state affairs was beyond acceptable limits.' The court drew a line between
"merely removing the levy limitation on an existing state or local taxing
' 64
authority... and creat[ing] an entirely new form of taxing authority. 1
C. The Supreme Court'sDecision
The State of Missouri, Jackson County, and a group of taxpayers
appealed the Eighth Circuit's affirmation of the property tax.65 The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari to Jackson County and the citizen
group, but agreed to hear the State of Missouri's argument regarding the
property tax."
The Court, without dissent, reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision to
allow the increased property tax to stand. 67 After arriving at this conclusion,
the Court might have ended its discussion of the case." Instead, the Justices
engaged in a spirited debate over whether a court, under the appropriate set
of circumstances, could duplicate the remedy prescribed by the district
court.6 While technically dicta, the remainder of the opinion provides
insight into the Court's division on the subject.
1. The "Majority" Opinion

°

The State of Missouri argued that the district court's action violated both
article three and the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution and
iiffringed upon the power of the state in its relationship with the federal
government.7' Justice White, writing for the majority, agreed that the district

63. Id.
64. I&
65. Jenkins, 110 S.Ct. at 1651.
66. See Clark v. Jenkins, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989) (denying certiorari); Jackson
County v. Jenkins, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989) (denying certiorari); Missouri v. Jenkins, 490
U.S. 1034 (1989) (granting limited certiorari).
67. Jenkins, 110 S.Ct. at 1651.
68. a at 1662-63.
69. Id. at 1663-79.
70. All nine Justices voted to reverse the order of the lower couri; therefore, there
is no true dissenting opinion in the case. The debate on the constitutionality of a
judicially-imposed tax was five to four. For purposes of this Note, the five Justices
supporting indirect judicial taxation will be labeled the majority. The four Justices
concurring only in part (Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
and Justice Scalia) will be labeled the dissent.
71. Id. at 1662.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/7
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court's action violated principles of federal/state comity but held that no
constitutional principles were violated?72
Justice White explained that Judge Clark should have ordered the school
board, which was the appropriate taxing authority, to set the tax levy at a level
adequate to the task rather than adjusting the levy himself.' He emphasized
a significant difference between these two approaches. 74 The majority
concluded that the implementation of its solution would enable any final
action to be of local origin.75
The opinion summarily dismissed the tenth amendment challenge.76
Using language from Milliken v. Bradley,77 in which the Court dealt with the
desegregation of the Detroit public schools, the court stated that "[t]he Tenth
Amendment's reservation of non-delegated powers to the States is not
implicated by a federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of
unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment."78
The Court relied primarily on two cases to dispel the state's contention
that article three would prohibit the indirect imposition of the property tax by
the judiciary. 79 The first case, Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward
County s arose when local officials allowed the county's public school to be
closed rather than to be segregated.8 ' The majority affirmed Judge Clark's
application of the holding to the facts in Jenkins.Y
The second case, Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 83 involved the
issuance of bonds with the understanding that a tax would be levied against
its citizens to pay off the notes8 4 The bonds were issued within the limits
of state law.' Before the city's obligations on the bonds had been satisfied,
the state passed legislation limiting the tax rate on real and personal property
to fifty cents per one hundred dollars of assessed valuation.86 As a result,

72. Id. at 1662-67.
73. Id. at 1663.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 1665.
77. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
78. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291
(1977)).

79. Id.
80. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
81. Id. at 222-23.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1665. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 542.
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the city could not fully meet its obligations and concluded that it was excused
from paying any amount in excess of what could be generated within the
limits set by the state law. A dissatisfied bondholder applied for a writ of
mandamus.' The United States Supreme Court held that the legislation,
with respect to the city's bond agreement, violated the Contract Clause of the
United States Constitution. 9 The Court reversed the decision of the circuit
court and ordered the city to meet its obligations on the bonds.'
2. The "Dissenting" Opinion
Justice Kennedy wrote to express his displeasure with what he believed
to be "an expansion of power in the federal judiciary beyond all precedent." 9'
First, he attacked the majority's premise that, while it was unacceptable for a
court directly to levy a tax, it was permissible for the court to direct the
KCMSD school board members to "levy property taxes at a rate adequate to
fund the desegregation remedy." 92 Justice Kennedy contended that "any
purported distinction between direct imposition of a tax by the federal court
and an order commanding the school district to impose the tax is but a
convenient formalism where the court's action is predicted on elimination of
state law limitations on the school district's taxing authority." 93 He argued
that the KCMSD is subject to the laws of Missouri, and Missouri law clearly
outlines the district's authority to tax. 94

Next, the dissent contended that judicial power, as expressed in article
three of the Constitution, does not mention the power to tax. 5 The dissent
viewed this silence as conclusive evidence that the courts do not possess any
power, directly or indirectly, to levy taxes. 96 The dissent further argued that
judicial taxing power poses due process concerns. 97

87. Id.
88. Il at 536.

89. Id. at 555.
90. ld.
91. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1667 (Kennedy, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment
[hereinafter dissenting opinion]).
92. Id. at 1663.
93. Id. at 1669-70.
94. Id. at 1670.
95. Id at 1670-72.

96. Id. at 1670.
97. Id. at 1671.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/7
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Finally, Justice Kennedy addressed the Court's action in Von Hoffman
and other similar cases cited by the majority. 98 He divided various mandamus actions into three categories. 9 He contended that the first group of
cases merely demonstrated that if a litigant is successful in a mandamus
action, government officials will be required to "perform a clear duty imposed
by state law."" The second group, which included Von Hoffman, stands
for the premise that a state may not pass legislation that affects an already
existing contract between a municipality and an independent party. 10 1 The
third group, which the dissent instructed would encompass Jenkins, holds that
"where there is no state or municipal taxation authority that the federal court
may by mandamus command the officials to exercise, the court is itself
without authority to order taxation.""° The dissent deemed this group of
cases, coupled with the previous arguments, sufficient to dispel the majority's
conclusions. 1°3
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. School DesegregationIn General
Since the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education,"° the
nation has attempted to desegregate its schools. While the courts have been
somewhat united in their quest to remedy past constitutional violations, their
approaches to the problem have been anything but uniform.0 5
There was considerable resistance to the desegregation movement during
the fifties and early sixties.'0 6 The subsequent decision of Brown v. Board
of Education (Brown f1)"07 instructed the desegregation process to move

98. Id. at 1674-76.
99. Id. at 1674-75.
100. Id. at 1674.
101. Id. at 1674-75.
102. Ik at 1675.
103. Id. at 1667.
104. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
105. Desegregation remedies may be implemented in various forms. Compare
Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (busing used to
achieve desegregation) with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (interdistrict
remedy not always appropriate). These are but two examples. See text accompanying
infra notes 113-17.
106. See K. ALEXANDER & M. ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBuC SCHOOL LAW

414-16 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER].
107. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 7
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

forward "with all deliberate speed."'"1 One commentator mused that "the
notion of all deliberate speed came to mean 'deliberate' for the white
establishment and 'speed' for the black plaintiffs. Interpretation of the phrase
boiled down to whose ox was getting gored."" ° Dissatisfied with the
progress of desegregation efforts, the Court, in Alexander v. Holmes,"'
modified the Brown II standard to one of immediacy. 1 '
Most desegregation remedies include pupil reassignment to achieve
acceptable racial balance among schools, additional funding to improve the
quality of the educational opportunity afforded to victims of past discrimination, or a combination of these two approaches. 112 Transporting of students
may occur within a single district or among multiple districts." 3 Numerous
variations of these basic approaches exist and are encouraged by the
Court. 4 In Green v. County School Board,"5 the Court once again
referred to its ultimate goal, stating that
[t]he obligation of the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the
effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation. There is no
universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; there is obviously
no one plan that Will do the job in every case. The matter must be assessed
in light of the circumstances present and the options available in each
instance."'
B. Judicial Taxation in School Desegregation Cases
The dissent outlined the various circuits' treatment of taxation questions
in desegregation actions." 7 At least one commentator has examined the
approaches in detail." He has classified the holdings into three groups:
courts that have refused to assume the power to tax; courts that have refused
to levy taxes in a particular case, but have stated that judicial taxation may be
108. Id. at 301.
109. Gordon, supra note 32, at 189.
110. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
111. Alexander v. Holmes, 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
112. See generally ALExANDER & ALExANDER, supra note 106, at 432, 438-41;
Note, Jenkins v. Missouri: The Future of InterdistrictDesegregation,76 GEo. L.J.

1867 (1988).
113. Gordon, supra note 32, at 191-93.
114. See text accompanying infra notes 115-16.
115. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
116. Id. at 439.
117. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1668-69.
118. See Wolohojian, JudicialTaxation in Desegregation Cases, 89 CoLUM. L.
REV. 332 (1989).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/7

12

Combs: Combs: Schoolbooks in the Missouri River

1991]

MISSOURI V. JENKINS

appropriate under a different set of circumstances; and courts that have levied
a tax.119 This framework is useful in understanding the current state of this
new, extremely controversial phenomenon.
Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have ruled that a federal judge may not
infringe upon state or local governments by levying a tax to fund a desegregation remedy." 2 The Fifth Circuit, in PlaqueminesParish School Board v.
United States,12' held that while a court may order funding of a desegregation remedy, "the 'necessity' for funds is to be measured against the quality
The Fifth Circuit
of instruction, equipment, books and transportation."'
held that the district court could not enact a "broadly written" order requiring
court could mandate action in a
desegregation funding, but that the district
"specific situation as to specific funds."' 23
124
spoke more
The Sixth Circuit, in National City Bank v. Battisti,
directly to the question of whether the judiciary could interfere with state law
in order to advance a desegregation remedy. The court was asked to make a
determination on a .petition for mandamus or prohibition.'25 The issue
before the court focused on the state's funding scheme and was peripheral to
the Cleveland Public School desegregation case."2 The court of appeals
ruled that the case was not properly before the court, and instead directed it
The court issued a directive to the district court,
to the district court.'
however, stating that "public schools are state controlled and supported by
state or local government. School financing is thus clearly a matter of state
responsibility through its appropriate executive, legislative and judicial
branches."' 2 The Sixth Circuit concluded that if a state, "for constitutionally neutral reasons," adopted measures regulating school finance, "the federal
courts have no power to pass judgment on the wisdom of the state deci-

sion. 029

The Third Circuit was considerably more cautious in its approach to the
desegregation funding issue. In Evans v. Buchanan,130 the appellate court

119. Id. at 332.
120. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1668 (dissenting opinion) (citing decisions of the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits).
121. 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
122. Id. at 833.
123. Id.
124. 581 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1977).
125. Id. at 566.
126. Id. at 569.
127. Id.
128. I&
129. Id.
130. 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978).
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was faced with a situation similar to Jenkins. The district court in Evans
created a new school district, merging the predominately black Wilmington
Public School District with a number of New Castle County suburban school

districts."

After creating the new district, the judge also set its tax rate,

subject to the legislature's approval13Z The judge warned, however, that
On appeal, the
any reduction in the rate would be closely scrutinized.'
Third Circuit felt that this warning intruded upon the legislature's power to tax
and instructed that the legislature sh6uld control the tax rate." 4 In retrospect, the Third Circuit neither embraced nor precluded the possibility of a

judicially imposed tax.3S
Madden v. Kentucky,'

6

Citing the 1940 Supreme Court decision of

the court, however, did caution that

in taxation, even more than other fields, legislatures possess the greatest
freedom in classification. Since the members of a legislature necessarily
enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit
and aggressive discrimination
demonstration that a classification is a hostile
137
against particular persons and classes.
To date, no case in the Third Circuit has met this stringent standard.
The Eighth Circuit adopted a considerably more aggressive position on
the subject. Originally, in United States v. Missouri,138 and subsequently in
Liddell and Jenkins, the court deemed judicial taxation an appropriate element
in constructing a desegregation remedy. 39 In Liddell, the district court had
ordered both the district and the State of Missouri to take action which, in
effect, would amount to a tax increase. 4 ' The appellate court refused to
allow the ruling to stand on the grounds that the district court 14had acted before
exhausting other appropriate, and less intrusive, alternatives. '

131. Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1001-03 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 582
F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978).
132. Id. at 1026.
133. Id.
134. Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 779 (3d Cir. 1978).
135. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1668 (dissenting opinion).
136. 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
137. Evans, 582 F.2d at 778 (quoting Madsen v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88
(1940)).
138. 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975).
139. Id. at 1372-73.
140. Liddell v. State of Mo., 731 F.2d 1294, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1984).
141. Id. at 1323.
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The Liddell court was explicit in its instructions to the district court as
to when a judicial tax increase would be allowed to stand. 42 The court
announced a four step analysis that must be employed to determine if a
judicially imposed tax is warranted.'43

First, the court must decide what

amount of money will be necessary to fund the remedy.'" Next, it should
determine whether the district has the resources to pay its portion of the
costs.14 Third, if the district will realize a deficit, the court should explore
other alternatives to generate revenue. 1' Finally, after all possible alternatives have been exhausted, the court "shall conduct an evidentiary hearing and
thereafter enter a judgment sufficient to cure the constitutional violations." 147
At this point, Eighth Circuit courts have "a1narrowly defined power to order
increases in local tax levies on real estate." '
The majority in Jenkins implicitly adopted the Eighth Circuit's standards
expressed in Liddell, with one exception. 49 Specifically, the Court required
future courts faced with appropriate fact patterns to order indirectly any tax
increase rather than to become involved directly.' 50
C. Politicaland Fiscal Considerations
Jenkins has stimulated emotions that parallel in intensity those expressed
during the early years of the desegregation movement. This is not to suggest
that Missouri, or Senator Danforth in his push for a constitutional amendment
against judicial taxation, are opposed to equal opportunity for minority

students. Recently, Senator Danforth was a member of a small group of
Republican senators voting to override the presidential veto of the Civil Rights
In addition, Senator Danforth has gone on record, stating
Act of 1990.'
that his "dispute with the remedial order in [Jenkins] should not2 be misconstrued as in any way implicit approval for segregated schools."'5
The State of Missouri has also acted in a manner consistent with its
approach to education in general. As of December 1990, Missouri ranked

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id,
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1320.
149. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1663.
150. Id.
151. 136 CONG. REc. S16589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (roll call vote).
152. Address by Senator John C. Danforth, University of Mo.-Columbia School
of Law, Earl F. Nelson Memorial Lecture (Nov. 2, 1990).
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42nd among the states in per capita funding for elementary and secondary
education in the United States. 3 If the amount attributable to desegregation
expenses was subtracted, the state would rank 49th.5 4 For the 1991-92
school year, the State Board of Education had requested an additional
144,000,000 dollars in basic state funding.'5
Governor John Ashcroft
countered, proposing a modest increase of only 1,200,000 dollars.'"6 The
state's efforts to challenge strenuously numerous issues in both Liddell and
Jenkins can be classified as representative of its general attitude toward the
.financing of public education.
Jenkins also involves some unusual fiscal facts. The KCMSD has not
passed a tax levy increase since 1969.5 7 Ironically, that was also the last
year in which caucasian children comprised a majority of the student
population.' Between 1969 and 1985 six attempts were made to pass a tax
levy increase.'5 9 Every attempt failed. 16° A school board member summarized the situation by stating, "[W]e started at a subsistence level, and then
went for 16 years without a raise. The school district found itself in a
situation like a poverty family that has to choose between food, shelter and
health care.'1 6' As a result of the desegregation remedy, the KCMSD has
afforded its children with a number of facilities and programs that few school
districts anywhere are capable of providing. 62 In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Kennedy provided a partial list of these improvements, including
high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an alarm
system, and 15 microcomputers; a 2,000-square-foot planetarium; greenhouses and vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an air-conditioned meeting room
for 104 people; a Model United Nations wired for language translation;
broadcast capable radio and television studios with an editing and animation
lab; a temperature controlled art gallery; movie editing and screening

153. St. Louis Post Dispatch, Nov. 27, 1989, at 1A,col. 4.
154. Id.at 5A, col. 2.
155.

R. BARTMAN,

INFORMATION

FROM

THE MIssouRi

DEPARTMENT

OF

ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, VOL. 24, No. 43 (Aug. 17, 1990).
156. Gov. J. ASHCROFr, ExEcuTIvE BUDGET, STATE OF MISSOURI, FISCAL YEAR

1992, at 2-2.
157. Jenkins v. State of Mo., 672 F. Supp. 400, 411 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
158. Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: Hearings on S.. Res. 295 and S.34 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate JudiciaryCommittee, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. _ (June 19, 1990) (statement of Sue Fulson, Member of the Board of Directors,
KCMSD) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Hearings].

159. Id.
160. 1d.
161. Id.
162. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1676-77 (dissenting opinion).
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rooms; a 3,500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room; 1875-squarefoot elementary 163
school animal rooms for use in a Zoo Project; [and]
swimming pools.
Thus, the KCMSD "rags to riches" story has been realized, but only at
a price; a price that many citizens of Kansas City were not willing to pay."6
Mark J. Bredemeier, General Counsel of the Landmark Legal Foundation, a
public interest foundation, stated that "over the past three years more than
15,000 Kansas City property taxpayers have paid under protest nearly $34
million of the $102 million worth of property tax revenues generated as a
result of the trial court's 1987 decision."'165 While some residents of the
KCMSD were outraged at the prospect of being forced to pay additional taxes,
it is ironic that a significant portion of the district's population is being forced
to pay for twenty-five percent of the costs to remedy violations of their
constitutional rights. 166 The plaintiffs in Jenkins also contend that others
who benefitted from the dual-school system have escaped liability.' 67

163. Id.
164. Hearings,supra note 159, at _ (statement of Mark J.Bredemeier, General
Counselor of the Landmark Legal Foundation).
165. Id. at -.

166. Members of minority races, through taxes, also pay a part of the State's
portion of the remedy.
167. The plaintiffs tried to join a number of Missouri and Kansas suburban

districts. School Dist. of Kansas City v. State of Mo., 460 F.Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo.
1978). See supra notes 11 & 13. In1989, a subset of the Jenkins' class filed suit
against a number of Kansas City, Missouri school districts. Naylor v. Lee's Summit
Reorganized School Dist., 703 F.Supp. 803 (W.D. Mo. 1989) rev'd sub nom. Jenkins
by Agyei v. State of Mo., 904 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Lee's
Summit Reorganized School Dist. v. Naylor, 111 S. Ct. 346 (1990). The plaintiffs
contended that a district court order requiring the State of Missouri and various Kansas
City, Missouri suburban school districts to develop and implement a voluntary
interdistrict program had been virtually ignored. Id. at 805-07. See Jenkins v. State
of Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied sub nom. Kansas City, Mo. School Dist. v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 816 (1987).
The district court ruled in favor of the suburban districts. Naylor, 703 F. Supp. at 823.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, ordering the district court to
develop its own plan. Jenkins by Ageyi v. State of Missouri, 904 F.2d 415 (8th Cir.
1990). A final solution to the problem has yet to be reached.
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ANALYSIS

Jenkins addresses delicate issues. It treads upon ground felt by many to
be hallowed. 168 Volumes have been written about the struggles of our
ancestors in forming a new nation free from the oppression of the British
crown. At the forefront of this process was the clear consensus that
government should have limits and that the citizenry should maintain ultimate
control over their lives either by the direct vote or through elected representatives. Few would contest that setting well-defined limits on the power of
taxation was a major concern.
Equally important, however, was the notion that government should be
constrained from infringing upon an individual's rights and liberties. The
fourteenth amendment guarantees to every citizen "equal protection under the
law.'69 This promise provided little comfort to persons in minority groups
who have continued to receive mistreatment implicitly sanctioned by
governmental bodies.
Brown, decided over eighty years after the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, sought to end the dual educational systems that existed throughout the nation.1 70 The phrase "separate but equal is inherently unequal" set
the tone for a new era of equal educational opportunity for all children
regardless of race.171 Jenkins represents an attempt to make both Brown and
the promises of the fourteenth amendment a reality for the children of Kansas
City. When these vitally important interests seem to conflict, neither side is
willing to concede any ground.
Both the majority and the dissent agreed that the district court exceeded
its authority in Jenkins.' The majority believed that the court should have
empowered the school board to set the levy "at a rate adequate to fund the
desegregation remedy."' 73 The court's direct involvement would be limited
to "enjoin[ing] the operation of state laws that would have prevented KCMSD
from exercising this power."' 74 The dissent considered this adjustment to
be "artificial" and unacceptable.' 75 Instead, the dissenting Justices would

168. Hearings,supranote 159, at _ (statement of Stephen B. Presser, Professor
of Law, Northwestern University).
169. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
170. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
171. Id.

172.
173.
174.
175.

Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1667 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 1663 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1670 (dissenting opinion).
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have supported a remedy which would have removed the constitutional
violation without disturbing Missouri's taxation scheme. 76
The dissent also argued that taxation by the judiciary poses due process
concerns.' 77 With judicial taxation, a citizen neither receives notice nor has
an opportunity to be heard 78 It is possible that the majority's notion of an
indirect tax would eliminate these concerns. By empowering the district to
levy the necessary tax, the burden shifts to the school board. School board
members are elected by the citizens and direc-tly responsible to them. If the
school board is overzealous in setting the new rate, its members will be held
accountable at the polls. Election campaigns would undoubtedly focus on this
important issue. Therefore, citizens would receive notice and have an
opportunity to be heard and the dissent's concerns about due process would
be addressed.
This course of action could create an interesting situation in Kansas City.
Citizen support for the district's agenda could fall somewhere between the
simple majority required to elect a school board member and the two-thirds
majority required to levy a tax increase. By indirectly empowering the district

to impose the tax, it is possible that the will of the majority, as opposed to a
super majority, would be carried out. While the district court would have to

enjoin state law to allow the board to act, this action would still be significantly less intrusive than direct imposition of the tax.
The dissent's most problematic constitutional argument focused on the
straightforward language of articles one and three.'79 Justice Kennedy noted
that "the description of judicial power nowhere includes the word 'tax' or
anything that resembles it."' 80 He stated that article one clearly places the
power to tax on the Congress and that article three supports this contention by
remaining silent when discussing the powers and duties of the judicial
branch.' While this is true, it appears that there have been other times in
this country's history in which the "plain language" approach has been
abandoned.
Two specific instances illustrate the abandonment of the "plain language"
approach. First, it is plainly stated that Congress has been given the power
"[tio declare War."''
There has been considerable debate, however,
concerning where the President's power as Commander-in-Chief begins and

176. Id. at 1670, 1677.
177. Id.
at 1671-72.
178. Id. at 1671.
179. Id.
at 1670-71.
180. Id. at 1670.
181. Id. at 1670-71.
182. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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ends. The War Powers Resolution was adopted to clarify who has what
power.1 83 The very existence of this legislation is proof that questions arise
even in an area that seems relatively straightforward. The Korean Conflict,
Vietnam "War," and the Gulf Crisis are three examples of comprehensive
military actions that have been conducted without any formal declaration of
war.
Another example is found within the fourteenth amendment. Section five
of the amendment states that "[t]he Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."1 4 Few members
of the judiciary would agree that, as a result of this provision, the courts are
powerless to act. Desegregation of schools is a reality today because the
courts, not Congress, took initial action.1 85 Often, it is the federal courts
that must take the lead on issues that involve the constitutional rights of
minorities.
It is possible that a supporter of indirect judicial taxation can sidestep the
above discussion and, instead, argue that the action approved by the Jenkins
majority did not involve the levying of an article one tax.
To accomplish this goal, it is crucial to distinguish between an article
one, section eight tax and the action suggested by the majority in Jenkins.
The action taken in Jenkins was a judicial remedy employed to remove the
effects of a constitutional violation. Taxes, in contrast, generally are viewed
to be political in nature."s Justice Kennedy alluded to this distinction in his
disapproval of the KCMSD remedy."8 7 In his discussion of the various
improvements ordered by the district court, Justice Kennedy stated that "these
items are part of a legitimate political debate over educational policy and

spending priorities, not the Constitution's command of racial equality.""
Justice Kennedy implicitly may have isolated the key factor that served as the
basis for the majority's conclusion that an indirect tax may be imposed. If a
component of a proposed remedy is necessary to remove the effects of
segregation and provide equal opportunity, then a court may take whatever
action is necessary to insure that the order is carried out. Once the components of a school desegregation remedy exceeds this goal, however, it
becomes political in nature and is beyond the purview of the judiciary.
This Note takes no position on whether the doctrine of indirect judicial
taxation should be applied to the facts of Jenkins. Both the majority and the
dissent agreed that the scope of the remedy was beyond the "limited grant of

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1988).
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Jenkins, 110 S.Ct. at 1672 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 1676-77.
Id. at 1677.
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certiorari.""9 Justice Kennedy, however, seemed particularly disturbed at
the extravagance of the district court's plan and made numerous references to
its provisions. 190 He noted that "the taxation power is sought here on behalf
Concern about the scope
of a remedial order unlike any before seen."''
of a desegregation plan in a given case, however, should have little effect on
the concept of indirect judicial taxation in general. One scholar agreed with
Justice Kennedy's conclusion, stating that "[t]he district court's $460 million
[dollar] gold-plated school desegregation remedy in Jenkins probably violated
the doctrine of remedial austerity, [though] that error was not reviewed by the
High Court."'92 It is vital for the Court to recognize that the principle of
indirect judicial taxation, and its suggested misapplication in Jenkins, should
not be confused.
The answer to the dilemma faced by the Court in Jenkins is affected by
the structure of the inquiry. If one asks the question, "Should a judge have
the right to levy a tax?", the answer would be a resounding NO! If one asks,
however, "Given the need to remedy an extremely damaging and longstanding
constitutional violation, can a court, when all other means of correcting the
violation have been exhausted, empower a local taxing authority to levy a tax
at a rate sufficient to correct the violation and enjoin state law when it
requires more than the majority of the people to accomplish the same act?",
the answer is less certain. This latter question is extremely narrow and there
is little chance that the grant of power can be abused.
V. CONCLUSION

David A. Strauss, Professor of Law at the University of Chicago,
appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the
Constitution to address the subcommittee on the Jenkins case.193 In his
testimony, he viewed the proposed constitutional amendment as "a serious
He argued that if this amendment is adopted, it "will
overreaction."'"
disable the courts in precisely those cases where the reasons for the broad
federal powers are the greatest-where a violation of the Constitution has been
shown, and there is no way to remedy that violation other than to order a tax
increase."' 95 What happens when a state, in an attempt to hinder desegrega-

189. Id. at 1664 (majority opinion), 1677 (dissenting opinion).
190. See text accompanying supra notes 164, 189.
191. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1676 (dissenting opinion).
192. Hearings,supra note 159, at _ (statement of Bruce Fein).
(statement of David A. Strauss, Professor of Law, University of
193. Id. at
Chicago).
194. Id. at
195. Id. at-.
-
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tion efforts, adopts a seventy-five or ninety percent voter approval rate to
increase a tax levy? Strauss contends that if the proposed constitutional
amendment is adopted, the only absolute protection is that of a "state engaged
in a flagrant, proven violation of its citizens' constitutional rights."'" This
end would defeat the goals of equal protection and undo the commendable
progress our nation has made in the desegregation arena.
RON COMBS

196. Id at-.
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